To control various access privileges in group-oriented applications having multiple data streams, we present a novel reactive key management scheme where each member can obtain the key of a data stream from public parameters only when necessary. Compared with the previous schemes, this scheme significantly reduces the amount of rekey messages for dynamic membership change due to its reactive nature.
Introduction
Group communication enables a group member to send large-scale data streams to other group members at the same time using multicast protocols. To guarantee that only legitimate group members can access the data streams, the streams are encrypted with a group key shared with only group members. If a member joins or leaves the group, the group key should be rekeyed to guarantee forward secrecy and backward secrecy of communications [1] . Extensive research have been conducted on group key management, and the Logical Key Hierarchy (LKH) [1] is a scalable scheme in which the communication cost for rekeying is reduced to O(log n) with group size n.
In many group-oriented applications such as Internet Broadcasting, there are multiple data streams and group members having different access privileges on them. Therefore, a novel key management scheme is necessary to control various access privileges. Recently, Sun et al. [2] and Zhang et al. [3] proposed LKH-based schemes where each data stream is encrypted with a corresponding secret key, and the higher privileged member keeps the more secret keys. These schemes are inefficient for a large number of data streams and various access privileges because each member should keep all secret keys associated with the accessible data streams. Moreover, in case of membership change, each member should always attend the rekeying protocol and update his secret keys regardless of necessity. Our motivation is based on the observation that even though there are numerous data streams accessible (e.g., in Internet radio stations or Podcasting), most members tend to access just one or two data streams simultaneously, which is demonstrated by the evaluation of the cocktail party effect [4] . We utilize this property to minimize the key management cost per each member.
In this letter, we present a new reactive key management scheme for access control where each member keeps only the keys of his subgroup and reactively obtains other secret keys from public parameters only when necessary. We show that both the storage cost and the communication cost of each member are significantly reduced compared with those in the previous schemes. Moreover, these advantages are more emphasized in the groups having various access privileges and complex access relations.
Construction of Unified Relations
Access control in group communications deals with group members' access privileges relative to data streams, which are specified by access relations. The access relations between group members and data streams can be formally represented by unified relations, whose construction is presented by Birget et al. [5] . In this method, the members having the same access privilege are grouped into a usersubgroup. Similarly, the data streams on which the same members have access privilege are grouped into a datasubgroup. Unified relations are made by reflecting the relations of user-subgroups and data-subgroups, and the hierarchy of unified relations is represented by a directed acyclic graph (DAG) G = (V, E). A vertex V i ∈ V may include one user-subgroup U i , i.e. U i ∈ V i , or one data-subgroup D i , i.e. D i ∈ V i , or both one user-subgroup and one data-subgroup, i.e. U i ∈ V i and D i ∈ V i .
The vertices are partially ordered by relation ≤: can access all data streams in D 2 and D 4 , while u ∈ U 4 can access only the data streams in D 4 .
A Reactive Key Management Scheme
With the DAG G = (V, E) in Sect. 2, we present a reactive key management scheme for access control in group communications. For each vertex V i , a secret key K i is assigned, which we call an access key, and each data stream in D i is encrypted with K i . The term reactive means that a privileged member obtains the access key of a data stream from public parameters only when he actually accesses the stream. This scheme is a kind of centralized approaches which employ a Key Distribution Center (KDC) to generate keys and distribute them to the members. The scheme also employs a Public parameter Access Center (PAC) that contains all public parameters. Anyone can read public parameters from the PAC at any time, but only the KDC can write the parameters to the PAC.
We assume that each user-subgroup U i is managed by the KDC with the operations: SUB INIT(U i , SK i ) and SUB REKEY(U i , SK i ). The former enables the KDC to initially distribute the subgroup key SK i to all members in U i securely, and the latter enables both the KDC and all members in U i to rekey current subgroup key to SK i . These operations can be implemented by any existing group key management schemes such as the LKH [1] scheme, and the following description is based on the LKH scheme.
The KDC constructs a logical binary key tree where each node represents a key and SK i is assigned to the root node. Each member corresponds to each leaf node, and securely receives the keys of the nodes along the path from his corresponding node to the root.
In case of a new member's join, the KDC allocates an empty leaf node to him and securely sends the leaf node key. In case of a member's leave, the KDC deletes the leaf node corresponding to him. Then, the KDC replaces the root key with SK i , and replaces the internal node keys along the path from his leaf node to the root with newly generated keys. Each new key is respectively encrypted with two node keys that only authorized members have access to, and transmitted to group members.
The following are used by the KDC and by group members.
• f K : a pseudo-random function with the key K.
• E K /D K : a symmetric encryption/decryption function with the key K.
• salt: a public random value.
Setup
For each vertex V i ∈ V, the access key K i is assigned as follows.
• If U i ∈ V i , the KDC randomly generates SK i and performs SUB INIT(U i , SK i ). Then, both the KDC and each member in U i derive
• If U i V i , the KDC randomly generates K i .
For example, in Fig. 2 both the KDC and u ∈ U 2 derive K 2 = f S K 2 (salt), and the KDC randomly generates K 5 . Finally, the KDC computes all public parameters and sends them to the PAC:
Accessing a Data Stream
If a member u ∈ U i wants to access a data stream d ∈ D j , he should discover K j as follows.
• If i = j, u already has K i .
• If i j and V j ≤ V i , u obtains R i j from the PAC, and then derives K j :
If K j is rekeyed while he is accessing d, he again obtains R i j from the PAC and derives K j . 
Size of multicast rekeying message
Size of public parameter 
By the property of pseudo-random functions [6] , only the members in U i knowing SK i can derive K i . For each V j ≤ V i (i j), the access key K j is also to be rekeyed. If U j ∈ V j , both each member in U j and the KDC derive a new access key from the previous access key:
Also, only the members in U j knowing SK j can derive K j . If U j V j , the KDC randomly generates a new access key K j . A remarkable point is that the KDC need not distribute rekeyed access keys to all members. Instead, for each rekeyed key K j , the KDC updates the following public parameters related to K j and sends them to the PAC to satisfy Eq. (2):
For example, suppose a member u ∈ U 2 leaves the group in Fig. 2 . The KDC distributes a new subgroup key SK 2 to the members in U 2 except for u by SUB REKEY(U 2 − {u}, SK 2 ) operation, and each member in U 2 locally derives K 2 = f SK 2 (salt). The next access key K 4 = f SK 4 (K 4 ) is locally derived by both each member in U 4 and the KDC, and K 5 is randomly generated by the KDC. The KDC also computes the parameters R 12 , R 14 , R 15 , R 24 , R 25 , R 35 , and sends them to the PAC.
Analysis of the Proposed Scheme
Let A i = {K m |V m ≤ V i } be a set of access keys the members in U i can discover. |S | denotes the cardinality of a set S , and L denotes the length of an encrypted key. Table 1 shows the comparison of the proposed scheme and Zhang et al.'s scheme [3] which further improves Sun et al.'s scheme [2] . In the proposed scheme, the number of access keys permanently stored by u ∈ U i is reduced to one and the size of rekeying message is reduced by 2|A i |L at the expense of additional L-sized message to access a data stream.
Communication Cost of a Group Member
Let us consider the amount of messages that a group member u ∈ U i receives during a time period T . For the comparison with Zhang et al.'s scheme, we omitted the messages for subgroup rekey because both scheme requires the same amount of messages. We assume that each membership change uniformly occurs among all user-subgroups at the frequency of λ r . We also assume that initially each member selects one data stream among all accessible streams, and he periodically changes the stream at the frequency of λ c .
In Zhang et al.'s scheme, |A i | access keys are rekeyed due to the membership change of U i . Let U be a set of all user-subgroups. Then the average number of rekeyed access keys per a membership change, a r , is calculated as
Thus, the expected total amount of messages that a group member receives during T is
E.g., in the case of the DAG in Fig. 1 , it is calculated as:
In the proposed scheme, each member obtains new parameter if a membership change occurs, or if he wants to access another data stream. First, consider the case of membership change. Assume u ∈ U i is accessing d ∈ D j when U k 's membership is changed. If the access key K j is not rekeyed, i.e. V j V k , or if he can derive new access key from his subgroup key, i.e. i = j, he does not receive a new parameter. Otherwise, he receives a new parameter from the PAC. Let P r (i) be the probability that u ∈ U i receives a new parameter for a membership change. Each P r (i) in Fig. 1 is calculated as follows: P r (1) = 0.52, P r (2) = P r (3) = 0.4, P r (4) = P r (6) = 0.
Second, consider the case of data stream change. Assume u ∈ U i changes the data stream he is accessing from d ∈ U j to d ∈ U j . If the new data stream is in the same datasubgroup with the old one, i.e. j = j , or if u can derive the access key of the new stream from his subgroup key, i.e. i = j , he does not receive a new parameter. LetD i be a set of data-subgroups that a member in U i can access. Then the probability that u ∈ U i receives a new parameter for a data stream change, P c (i), is approximately
assuming each data-subgroup has a large number of data streams. E.g., each P c (i) in Fig. 1 is calculated as:
Therefore, the expected total amount of messages that a group member u ∈ U i receives during T is
We note that the membership change frequency, λ r , of a group increases as the group size increases since the more members the group has, the more membership changes the group deals with. On the other hand, the stream change frequency, λ c , of a member reflects the tendency of his own: some member will probably change streams very frequently, and another member will rarely change streams. An important point is that the frequency λ c is independent of the group size. The average frequency of all members in a very large group is probably similar to the one in a relatively small group. We also note that T Zhang increases as the DAG becomes large and complex since a r also increases, while in the proposed scheme
at most with even a very large and complex DAG. Therefore, the proposed scheme is more scalable for large groups with a large number of data streams and various access privileges. For further comparison, we performed simulation to estimate the actual amount of messages that a member receives. The sequence of membership changes is generated with Poisson distribution at rate λ r . For each membership change, one user-subgroup is uniformly selected among U 1 ∼ U 6 , and rekey message is distributed to all group members. Each member is respectively assigned the sequence of stream changes generated with Poisson distribution at rate λ c . For each stream change, he uniformly selects one data stream among all accessible streams, and obtains public parameters from the PAC if necessary. Figure 3 shows the comparison of Zhang et al.'s scheme and the proposed scheme with λ r = 0.1, λ c = 0.2. In case of the proposed scheme, the average received messages of all members in the same user-subgroup are plotted. The messages of U 3 and U 6 are omitted because they are similar to the messages of U 2 and U 4 , respectively. As can be seen, the proposed scheme reduces the amount of received messages by more than 60%, which can be verified by Eq. (8) and Eq. (10). Figure 4 compares the total received messages of a group member during T = 2000 with varying λ r and fixed λ c = 0.2. As can be seen, the advantage of the proposed scheme is more emphasized as λ r increases, in other words, the group size increases.
Cost of KDC
The KDC has responsibility not only to rekey access keys but also to update related public parameters. As the number of keys stored by the KDC is the same in both Zhang et al.'s scheme and the proposed scheme, the cost to generate new access keys is also the same. After rekeying K i to K i by the function f or by a random choice, the KDC computes related public parameters and sends them to the PAC.
If the more privileged subgroup's membership is changed, the more access keys are rekeyed by the KDC. In the worst case, if the unified relations are totally ordered and the highest privileged subgroup's membership is changed, |V| access keys are rekeyed and
parameters are newly computed. However, since |V| is not greater than hundreds in practice independently of the number of group members, recent high-performance servers can compute them in less than 1 second. Moreover, these parameters are not multicasted to group members but only sent to the PAC.
Security of Public Parameters in the PAC
Since the public parameters in the PAC are publicly opened, a malicious adversary may try several attacks on them: he may try to passively discover access keys to access unauthorized data streams, or try to actively disturb the functionality of group communication. In this section, although we have no rigorous security proof, we briefly show the proposed scheme is secure against the above threats.
Let us first consider a passive attack where an outside adversary tries to discover access keys from public parameters. Although he can obtain any parameters, he cannot discover unauthorized access keys because the parameters are generated by encrypting an access key with another key, which is based on the confidentiality of used block cipher algorithm such as AES-128. Thus, by Eq. (2), any adversary who wants to obtain K j should either have K i satisfying V j ≤ V i by capturing a member in U i , or perform cryptanalysis with parameters to get K j . In the former case, protection of member capturing is beyond the scope of this letter, and another tools such as traitor tracing [7] may help to find captured members. In the latter case, an adversary can get several plaintext-ciphertext pairs from parameters and access keys to which he is authorized, and try a known plaintext attack on the block cipher algorithm. However, recent block cipher algorithms are designed to be secure against such an attack with these insufficient pairs [8] .
Let us then consider an active attack where an adversary tries to distribute wrong parameters to confuse group members. In the proposed scheme, the KDC is a trusted entity, as in all previous schemes, and the PAC is securely maintained by the KDC. Since only the KDC is allowed to write public parameters to the PAC, the adversary cannot actively write wrong parameters. To prevent an adversary from forging transmitted parameters, integrity protection and authentication of parameters are necessary. If group members are trusted, using a Message Authentication Code with the group key provides group authentication. If group members cannot be trusted, using a digital signature by the KDC provides source authentication, as with the LKH scheme adding signature to rekeying message.
